Electricity deregulation likely to benefit consumers: later, if not sooner by Stephen P.A. Brown & Sheila Dolmas
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s LECTRICITY MAY BE getting cheaper. Market forces rather
than regulators will soon be setting electricity rates in some
areas of the United States. A wave of regulatory and legisla-
tive change has called for deregulation of electricity markets
in 18 states over the next few years, and many more states 
are considering similar changes. Meanwhile, at the national
level, the administration has proposed deregulating electricity mar-
kets by 2003.
Although the United States has low electric rates and high relia-
bility by international standards, the rates are quite uneven across the
nation (Chart 1). Proponents of deregulation argue that competition
will lower electric rates, particularly in the regions with high rates,
and make them more uniform throughout the nation. The high-rate
states seem to be expecting such an outcome, as the states with
above-average electricity rates have been more inclined to deregulate
(Chart 2). Whether such an outcome is realized depends greatly on





The New Labor Paradigm:
More Market-Responsive 
Rules of Work and Pay
Financial Crisis and Structural
Reform Plans in KoreaThis article provides an overview of
how deregulation could change the
way electricity is produced and sold,
the changes in competition and prices
that are likely to result from deregula-
tion, and the effect of deregulation on
investors. System reliability, fuel mix and
air quality are also briefly addressed.
The U.S. Electricity Industry Today
Currently, most regions of the coun-
try are served by integrated electric 
utilities, each of which performs all four
functions of the electricity industry—
generation, transmission, distribution
and marketing. Each utility generates
most of its own electricity and buys
some from other producers. It then
ships the electricity from its generators
over its high-voltage transmission lines
to its substations. At the substations, the
utility steps down the voltage and from
there distributes the electricity over
lower voltage lines to its customers.
Most of the integrated companies are
publicly traded firms. Their electric
rates are subject to regulation at the
state level, and in the typical process,
rates are set to earn what the regulators
deem to be a fair rate of return on 
prudent investments. In a few excep-
tional cases, state regulators have re-
fused to allow a utility’s rate base to
reflect the costs of what they have
judged to be poor investment decisions
made by the utility.
The areas of the country with the
highest electric rates typically have the
highest cost generation facilities. The
utilities owning these generation facili-
ties invested in costly power plants,
such as nuclear power plants. The costs
of these investments are usually in-
cluded in the utilities’ rate bases, which
are approved by state regulators. Many
of these facilities were built during an
era in which it was generally believed
conventional energy prices would rise
sharply over the foreseeable future.
In addition, various federal and, in
some cases, state regulations compel
the electric utilities to buy electricity
from a variety of independent, high-cost
producers at preferential rates. Most im-
portant among the producers receiving
preferential rates are those using cogen-
eration or wind power to generate elec-
tricity. These regulations were justified
on the basis of curbing oil imports, im-
proving energy efficiency and reducing
pollution.
It might seem that high-cost regions
could reduce their electricity rates by
purchasing electricity from low-cost 
regions, but transportation costs limit
interregional electricity trade. Integrated
companies buy and sell electricity from
each other and exchange it over a 
nationwide grid of transmission lines,
but transmitting electricity over long
distances is expensive.
Proposals for Change
Deregulation consists of opening one
or more segments of the current system
to competition. Some segments could
remain regulated. Although deregulation
proposals vary considerably, the most
common ones include these elements:
• Electricity generation and market-
ing would be opened to competi-
tion.
• Transmission and distribution would
remain regulated monopolies and
become contract carriers like nat-
ural gas pipelines.
• Electric marketers would buy elec-
tricity from generators, sell it to
customers and arrange for its trans-
portation from the generator to the
customer.
• The integrated utilities would spin
off their deregulated activities as
separate companies.
• Some independent high-cost gen-
erators would lose their preferen-
tial rates.
Under some proposals, only large in-
dustrial customers would buy their elec-
tricity from the electricity marketing
firms. Residential customers would con-
tinue to buy electricity from their dis-
tributor, as has been the case with
natural gas deregulation.
As promoted, deregulation would
lower electricity prices by introducing
competition in generation and market-
ing. In the short run, deregulation
would allow electricity generated in
low-cost facilities in adjacent regions to
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SOURCE: U.S. Energy Information Administration.come into high-cost regions over the
national grid of transmission lines and
be sold in direct competition with local
suppliers. (High transmission costs
would prevent much competition from
distant facilities.) The resulting compet-
itive pressure would reduce the prices
that the owners of the high-cost facili-
ties could charge, immediately lowering
rates in the high-rate regions. Over the
long run, the free entry of new low-cost
competitors and the potential for new
entrants should also help promote
lower, competitive prices.
Stranded Assets:
An Obstacle to Deregulation
The treatment of high-cost genera-
tion facilities has been one of the major
issues in deregulation. Under regula-
tion, state regulatory authorities typi-
cally have set electricity rates to ensure
that a utility’s total revenues equal its
total costs plus a fair market rate of 
return on plant investments. With the
lower market prices for electricity that
are expected after deregulation, owners
of existing high-cost facilities are likely
to find that their fixed investment costs
are no longer covered. In discussions 
of deregulation, these investments are
commonly known as stranded assets.
Estimates of stranded assets resulting
from deregulation range from $10 bil-
lion to $500 billion.
1 The unknowns that
influence these estimates are the degree
of competition under deregulation, fu-
ture natural gas prices and the timing of
deregulation.
The issue of who will pay for these
stranded assets has been one of the
major stumbling blocks to deregulation
in the very regions of the country with
high electric rates. Seventeen of the 18
states that have deregulated have made
some provisions for recovery of
stranded assets.
2 These states used a 
variety of measures to distribute the
costs of previous electricity plant invest-
ments.
In most states, the legislation per-
mitting deregulation requires the cus-
tomers benefiting from lower, competi-
tive prices to compensate the owners of
stranded assets by paying exit fees or
transition charges on top of the newly
competitive electric rates. Proponents of
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one of the major issues
in deregulation.argue that the change in regulation
amounts to a taking, which deserves
compensation. Legally, they are proba-
bly wrong; there is no legal presump-
tion that one may rely on continuing
government regulation to earn a profit.
Proponents of this approach argue that
those who have invested in an industry
in which the returns depend on con-
tinuing government regulation should
have realized that they were taking a
risk that government regulations could
change and that the price they paid for
their shares was lower to compensate
for the risk.
Some argue further that electric com-
panies deserve no compensation for
their stranded assets whether or not
those companies should have antici-
pated deregulation. Advocates of this
view believe that stranded assets are the
result of bad investment decisions (such
as building nuclear power plants) made
by electricity companies in the belief
that, if the investment failed, pliant state
regulatory agencies would permit these
companies to recover their losses by
raising rates charged to their customers.
They argue that since the companies
had no guarantee they would have
been reimbursed under the prederegu-
lation regime, companies have no right
to insist upon reimbursement in a
deregulated environment.
Free market economists have taken
positions in favor of shareholders bear-
ing the costs of stranded assets and in
favor of customer payment of exit fees
or transition charges. Although some
would prefer that shareholders bear the
cost for the reasons discussed above,
they also believe that some payment
from customers may be a political 
necessity to introduce competition and
prevent future investment in high-cost
facilities. One important complication
here is that many state pension funds
seem to be heavily invested in electric
utility stocks and may take sizable
losses if a state proceeds with uncom-
pensated deregulation.
Concerns About Deregulation
Some analysts remain concerned that
deregulation will result in monopoliza-
tion rather than competition because
transmission costs are high and firms
will have locational advantages. Under
the most common proposals, however,
it seems that deregulation will result in
a workable amount of competition. The
outcome is likely to be one in which
most firms have locational advantages
resulting from high transmission costs
but earn normal rates of return on their
prudent investments. Shipment of elec-
tricity from neighboring regions and the
entry or potential entry of low-cost gen-
erators will limit monopolistic pricing.
The ability of customers to vote with
their feet by moving to lower cost re-
gions will also help foster competitive
pricing.
Some individuals worry that the reli-
ability of electricity provision will de-
cline after deregulation. As an industry
that has earned a regulated rate of re-
turn above the market average, the
electric utility industry has had an in-
centive to overcapitalize. One result of
that overcapitalization has been to pro-
vide more excess capacity (and reliabil-
ity) than would exist in a competitive
industry. Under deregulation, reliability
is likely to be adjusted to levels pre-
ferred by the market. Those who want
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this approach argue that the compensa-
tion scheme would allow society to
begin to capture the benefits of compe-
tition and prevent future investment in
high-cost facilities while compensating
the stakeholders in the current system
for accepting its abolition. Of course,
customer payment of exit fees or transi-
tion charges as part of the electric bill
would delay the hoped-for decline in
effective electricity prices in those re-
gions with the highest electric rates.
Such fees were cited by Enron as one
reason that its attempt to sell electricity
to California households was relatively
unsuccessful.
Several other ideas have been of-
fered for the resolution of stranded 
assets. One proposal is to let taxpayers
compensate investors for the capital
losses that result from changes in regu-
lation. But taxpayer compensation of
shareholders who suffer losses as the
result of changes in legislation is rare.
Another approach is to let the share-
holders of the electric utilities and inde-
pendent generators bear the costs if
competitive pricing yields less than a
normal return on their capital invest-
ments. Opponents of this approach
Choosing Reliability of Electricity Service
The ability to pay for reliability is not completely new. The U.S. Energy Information Ad-
ministration (EIA) reports that utilities for a long time have allowed a few customers to tailor
the level of reliability to fit their needs and budgets.
1 The customers generally outline a set of
conditions under which their electric service may be interrupted in exchange for a lower rate.
New technologies may also play a part in system reliability. Individuals could choose reli-
ability by responding to price schedules announced by the utility. Utilities could then vary
prices over time based on supply and demand. In peak periods of electricity use, the price
would be higher, and during periods of lower use, the price would fall. No customers would
be denied electricity if they were willing to pay the market-clearing price. Such a system
would reduce electricity use during peak periods. Telephone companies have used a similar
pricing system for many years.
One company that is operating in states with pilot projects for electricity competition gives
customers Internet access to reports on their hour-by-hour energy use and charges. The
company also sells new refrigerator-sized power plants that businesses such as restaurants
or small factories can use to avoid paying peak rates or losing power in outages.
Another possibility is for utilities to selectively interrupt just part of a customer’s service,
such as the electricity that goes to a major appliance, under circumstances agreed upon 
in the customer’s contract. The EIA reports that some utilities already have the technology to
do so.
2
1 EIA, “Performance Issues for a Changing Electric Power Industry” (visited May 5, 1998)
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/fuelelectric.html>.
2 See note 1.considerable reliability will have an 
opportunity to pay for it (see box en-
titled “Choosing Reliability of Electricity
Service).
Another concern about deregulation
is the potential effect on air pollution.
Not much will happen initially to the fuel
mix used or the air pollution produced
in generating electricity. Firms investing
in new electricity-generating capacity
will have an incentive to use the lowest
cost sources. Such investment favors the
direct use of carbon-based fuels over
wind power, cogeneration and nuclear
energy, which could increase air pollu-
tion. On a pure cost basis, one might
predict that coal (the fuel with the most
potential for emissions) could become
more heavily used, but the U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA) fore-
casts that most of the new electricity-
generating capability added in coming
years will be either combined-cycle gas
turbine or combustion turbine/diesel
technology.
3 Of course, such decisions
will be greatly affected by changes in
technology and environmental regula-
tions.
The Bottom Line
Proponents of deregulation argue
that introducing competition will lower
electric rates. The states with the high-
est cost electricity seem to be expecting
such an outcome because they have
been the most aggressive in pursuing
deregulation.
In the short run, deregulation would
allow electricity generated in low-cost
facilities in adjacent regions to be sent
to high-cost regions over the national
grid of transmission lines and to be 
sold in direct competition with local
suppliers. The resulting competitive
pressure would reduce the prices that
the owners of the high-cost facilities
could charge, immediately lowering
rates in the high-rate regions. The short-
run gains could be mitigated to some
extent by state-imposed charges to com-
pensate the owners of high-cost gen-
eration facilities. Over the long run,
however, the high-cost generation facili-
ties will be fully depreciated and the
charges will be phased out. In addition,
the free entry of new low-cost competi-
tors and the potential for new entrants
should also help promote lower, com-
petitive prices.
Some critics have expressed concern
about the possible development of un-
regulated monopolies, but the shipment
of electricity from neighboring regions
and the entry or potential entry of low-
cost generators will limit the likelihood
of monopolistic pricing. The ability of
customers to vote with their feet by
moving to lower cost regions will also
help foster competitive pricing. In short,
deregulation and the resulting competi-
tion should lower prices for customers
over the long run even if gains are lim-
ited in the short run.
— Stephen P. A. Brown
Sheila Dolmas
Notes
1 EIA, “Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry: An Update”
(visited May 5, 1998) <http://www.eia.doe.gov/fuelelectric.html>.
2 Virginia’s restructuring law allows recovery of some stranded assets,
but the details won’t be decided upon until 1999.
3 See note 1.
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Electricity Deregulation in the Southwest
Most of the Southwestern states have electricity rates close to the national average. All the
states in the region are looking into electricity deregulation. Two states have moved forward
with plans that would bring full competition to retail electricity markets by 2003.
With the highest electricity rates among the Southwestern states, Arizona was the quick-
est to move forward with electricity deregulation. Arizona issued a regulatory order in 
December 1996 to phase in retail electricity competition beginning in January 1999, with full
competition by January 2003. The plan called for recovery of some stranded assets through
exit fees.
1
Despite having below-average electricity rates, Oklahoma passed a law in April 1997 that
directs state officials to study and develop a framework to introduce retail electricity compe-
tition by July 2002. This law allows collection of transition charges over a three- to seven-year
period to recover stranded assets. One limitation imposed by the state on these charges is
that they must not cause the total price of electricity to rise above the price charged during
the transition period.
2
A large and diverse state, Texas has a mix of high- and low-cost electricity sources. Texas
is still investigating electric utility deregulation.
3 Some areas of the state, such as Dallas/Fort
Worth and Houston, could see substantially lower electric rates as a result of deregulation,
while shareholders of the firms with stranded assets take sizable losses. Some such firms are
trying to delay deregulation to gain time to recoup some of the stranded assets that might not
be recovered under the final version of deregulation.
Louisiana, with electricity rates similar to those in Texas, is also investigating the implica-
tions of electricity deregulation. A 1997 legislative resolution created a study committee that
will report on a variety of deregulation issues this year.
4
In New Mexico, a pilot program is under way to introduce customer choice through the
Texas–New Mexico Power Company’s Community Choice plan. However, no statewide com-
petition has yet been introduced. The New Mexico Public Utility Commission (PUC) is pro-
moting deregulation and in February submitted a proposal to the governor and legislature
that would give the PUC authority to resolve deregulation issues. However, legislation on the
issue is not expected to be introduced until next year.
5
1 EIA, “Performance Issues for a Changing Electric Power Industry” (visited May 5, 1998)
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/fuelelectric.html>.
2 See note 1.
3 See note 1.
4 See note 1.
5 See note 1.N THE LAST year or so, inflation
has drifted lower while the unem-
ployment rate has fallen below
trigger levels that historically have
been associated with rising rates
of inflation. Indeed, since mid-
1996 the unemployment rate has been 
5 percent or lower—well below the 5.5
percent to 6 percent trigger-level esti-
mates of many mainstream empirical
economists—while consumer price in-
flation has remained tame.
1
One explanation for this combina-
tion of low unemployment and sub-
dued inflation is that we are in an era in
which massive technological innovation
and intense competition are curtailing
inflation. Under this new paradigm,
three sources of inflation restraint are
(1) cheaper imports from increased
worldwide capacity, (2) fiercer compe-
tition among firms in nontraded goods
industries, and (3) technological inno-
vations that boost productivity.
2 Behind
the first two sources is the idea that in-
creased competition in product markets
has restrained firms from bidding up
wages and has led companies to find
better ways of employing and paying
workers that have made work and pay
more market responsive.
After reviewing how and why the
rules of work and pay have been
changing, this article briefly assesses
how well the new labor paradigm is
functioning in the United States and how
well other major economies are per-
forming. Finally, the broader meaning of
these new labor practices is discussed.
How New Rules of Work and 
Pay Are More Market Responsive
In general, work and pay have be-
come increasingly market sensitive.
With respect to employment, this sensi-
tivity is reflected in a declining share of
union workers covered by medium-
and long-term wage contracts and in
the rising use of temporary and part-
time workers. Chart 1 shows the falling
share of private-sector workers repre-
sented by unions and indicates that the
most dramatic declines occurred in the
late 1970s and early 1980s.
3
The increased use of temporary and
part-time workers has also made em-
ployment more market sensitive. By
switching to such workers, firms lower
production costs not only by paying
fewer benefits but by better matching
employment to swings in production—
for example, using part-time workers 
to handle busier weekend shopping 
periods.
In three key ways, pay has also be-
come more market sensitive. First, long-
term wage contracts—which set wages
well ahead of market conditions—are
less prevalent, as evidenced by declin-
ing unionization rates. Second, fewer
union contracts contain indexation
clauses that boost wages for inflation
according to a negotiated formula
(Chart  2).
4 While indexation protects
workers’ purchasing power, it also ties a
firm’s wage bill more to general price
increases than to the price of that firm’s
particular output. Clearly, inflation risk,
which is often measured by the inflation
rate, boosts the use of indexation for-
mulas. For example, in the high-inflation
1970s, indexation clauses were com-
mon as workers sought to protect their
purchasing power from high and vari-
able inflation. However, inflation is not
the only factor affecting the use of 
indexation provisions. Inflation in the
early 1990s was at levels near those of
the 1950s, but indexation was only half
as prevalent in the more recent period.
The third key change is that profit
sharing has risen dramatically since the
early 1980s. Chart 3 shows the in-
creased portion of workers who enjoy
profit-sharing provisions among those
who have either defined-benefit or 
defined-contribution pension coverage.
5
Most of these profit-sharing provisions
include employee stock-ownership plans
or profit-based contributions to thrift
plans. Other data show less use of non-
deferred forms of profit sharing, such as
cash bonuses.
Deferred profit sharing is more com-
mon because workers do not have 
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SOURCE: Duca and VanHoose (1998). See note 3.
Chart 2
Fewer Union Contracts 
Indexed for Inflation as
Compared with the 1950s




















SOURCE: Duca and VanHoose (forthcoming). See note 7.of inflation indexation also follow these
patterns.
Some industries are more suited to
profit sharing than others because the
nature of work and the ability to meas-
ure an individual’s contributions vary
across sectors. Such factors would 
account for differences across industries
in a given time period, while changes in
generational attitudes might account for
why profit sharing has risen in general.
However, changes in how much com-
petition an industry faces relative to
others might explain why profit sharing
has risen more in some industries than
in others. Indeed, the largest increases
in profit sharing have occurred in sec-
tors with greater foreign competition,
such as manufacturing, or in deregu-
lated sectors, such as transportation
(Chart  5 ).
9
How Well Are the New Rules of 
Work and Pay Performing 
in the United States?
For Americans, the new labor para-
digm has (1) increased short-run job
and pay variability, (2) fostered the use
of portable pensions like IRA and thrift
plan accounts, (3) forced workers to
focus more on lifetime employability
than lifetime employment at a particular
firm, and (4) boosted the use of profit
sharing. Quite apart from business cycle
sufficient wealth to smooth their con-
sumption if their weekly take-home pay
were to vary with profits that are highly
sensitive to market conditions. They
are, however, better able to handle
profit-related volatility in their compen-
sation over a longer horizon, such as in
their retirement accounts. Nevertheless,
recent salary and Federal Reserve Beige
Book surveys indicate that annual base/
hourly pay is increasingly being supple-
mented by variable cash bonuses. This
shift suggests that pay is becoming more
market responsive in both the short run
and the long run.
Why New Rules of Work and 
Pay Are More Market Responsive
Arguably, greater competition forces
firms to become more efficient because
of tighter profit margins and heightened
fear of losing market share to lower cost
competition. Fiercer competition can
arise not only in traded goods industries
facing foreign competition, but also in
deregulated markets, such as telecom-
munications. In these markets, the entry
of new firms and the ending of price
and other regulations have forced firms
to compete more with one another. In
such an environment, firms no longer
enjoy the safe profit margins and pro-
tection from competition that once en-
abled them to shield workers from
swings in market conditions.
In particular, greater competition in-
duces firms to make pay and work
more market sensitive; to cut manage-
ment and add incentives to compen-
sation so workers become more
self-managed; and to share profits in 
exchange for wage cuts when compa-
nies are restructuring. Greater competi-
tion also encourages firms to use profit
sharing to make pay more market re-
sponsive. With tougher competition,
profits are more tightly aligned with a
worker’s market value because prices
and profits more closely reflect wage
costs adjusted for productivity. As a re-
sult, profit sharing should trend upward
with a measure of market competition.
Chart 3 plots a measure of competition,
which rises as firms’ pricing power de-
clines and which is adjusted for swings
related to the business cycle, oil prices
and exchange rates.
6 Research has
shown that as this overall measure of
competition rises, long-run wage con-
tracts and inflation indexation in labor
contracts become less prevalent.
7 But
how can we tell competition is the key
factor making work and pay more mar-
ket sensitive? One way is to compare
deregulated and traded goods industries
with other sectors.
Industry data indicate that the drop
in unionization since the early 1980s
stems mostly from declines in unioniza-
tion rates within industries rather than
from shifts in employment from more
unionized industries to less unionized
ones. Moreover, the biggest declines in
unionization rates were in manufac-
turing and deregulated industries, as
shown in Chart 4.
8 Declines in the use

















SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics; author’s
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Chart 5
Profit Sharing Rises 
in Manufacturing and
Deregulated Industries
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Chart 3
The Rise of Profit Sharing
and Goods Market Competition






















SOURCE: Duca and VanHoose (forthcoming). See note 6.fluctuations, American workers face
more uncertainty. By this standard
alone, the new labor paradigm seems to
be a step down. However, economic
conditions change, which implies that
older labor practices may no longer
function well, particularly in a more
competitive marketplace. Therefore, de-
termining whether we would have been
better off with the old rules and
whether labor practices used in other
industrialized nations have worked
better in recent years would be better
criteria for evaluating the new labor
paradigm.
How Well Are Other 
Labor Markets Performing?
In Germany, France and Italy, laws
protect workers from being fired and
industries from domestic and foreign
competition. Consequently, senior wor-
kers at big established firms enjoy job
security, long vacations and high pay
indexed for inflation. However, by
boosting labor costs above market lev-
els, these rigid practices have resulted
in stymied job creation for the young;
mounting, double-digit unemployment
rates; slow economic growth; and high
taxes and high budget deficits.
In Japan and South Korea, as in Con-
tinental Europe, laws protect workers
from being fired and firms from much
competition. However, two key differ-
ences exist. First, pay includes a year-
end company-wide bonus that partly
reflects company profits. Second, large
conglomerates dominate these econo-
mies and move workers with lifetime
employment from slack industries to
faster growing ones. Thus, the Japanese/
South Korean system makes pay and
employment more market sensitive than
in Continental Europe, but this market
sensitivity is far less so than in the
United States. As a result, the need to
lay off workers or to cut pay dramati-
cally in dying industries has mounted
over the long run. So rather than con-
tinuously make enough minor market
adjustments, Japanese and South Korean
firms have allowed problems to build to
the point that very large and painful
changes will be required.
One international bright spot is Great
Britain, which has allowed restructur-
ings, scaled back legal “job protections”
and cut unemployment and welfare
benefits that encourage idleness. Like
American workers, British workers now
endure increased short-run job and 
pay uncertainty. But, paradoxically,
they enjoy greater long-run employa-
bility within their whole economy. They
also can expect better income prospects
in the form of lower unemployment
and faster growth, which have resulted
from adopting a more market-oriented
system.
What Is the Broader Meaning 
of the New Labor Paradigm?
Fundamentally, new labor practices
in the United States have made pay and
work more market responsive. Further-
more, the new labor paradigm in the
United States and Great Britain has out-
performed the older ones of other
major economies in the 1990s. But this
paradigm also has implications for
monetary policy and economic policy
in general.
With respect to monetary policy, the
new labor paradigm has several impli-
cations for economic gauges and for
Federal Reserve policy. First, increased
profit sharing has made obsolete our
existing wage measures, which exclude
many deferred forms of profit sharing.
Thus, labor costs are likely rising faster
and are more flexible than our gauges
indicate.
More significantly, the greater com-
petition that has spawned new rules of
work and pay affects the relationship
between tight labor markets and infla-
tion in several ways. First, the more 
important foreign trade, the more sig-
nificant import prices are for our infla-
tion rate. Second, greater competition
implies that capacity pressures affect in-
flation more slowly because when the
economy is overheated, individual firms
risk losing more market share if they in-
crease prices before competitors do.
Third, firms are willing to produce more
at a given price under greater competi-
tion, implying that the economy can
sustain higher capacity levels without
causing a rise in inflation.
10 Neverthe-
less, there is a good deal of uncertainty
about where the new trigger levels are.
Fourth, to some extent the increased
market sensitivity of work and pay en-
ables the economy to adjust more read-
ily to new technology, which boosts the
incentives for innovation and, conse-
quently, long-run sustainable growth.
The new labor paradigm has other,
more general policy and economic im-
plications. Increased profit sharing
means that current wage measures un-
derstate total pay, further implying that
living standards for U.S. workers have
been understated. And the increased
use of stock options and profit sharing
indicates that outside investors face the
risk that future profits will be diluted
when stock options are exercised or
profits are shared. Therefore, additional
and better disclosure of profit-sharing
arrangements is needed. New rules 
requiring firms to report profits on a 
diluted basis constitute a major step in
this direction.
At another level, the new labor-market
flexibility fosters more frequent eco-
nomic adjustments. While this boosts
short-run uncertainty, it reduces the risk
of big, costly adjustments. For this rea-
son, fewer imbalances build that typi-
cally come to a head during economic
downturns when finding new jobs is
harder for laid-off workers. Paradoxi-
cally, the very labor paradigm that 
has subjected American workers to 
increased short-run adjustments and un-
certainty has reduced long-run uncer-
tainty and boosted growth by creating 
a healthier overall economy. In con-
trast, workers abroad who have more
legal job protection are facing mount-
ing unemployment and huge, costly 
adjustments.
Some nations, particularly those in
Continental Europe, are reluctant to
shed the job-firing laws and anticompe-
tition policies that have contributed to
their double-digit unemployment rates.
Instead of letting their labor markets
adapt to the economic churn of job
(and firm) creation and destruction,
Germany, France and Italy are pursuing
a currency union as an elixir to their
poor economic performance at a time,
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(Continued on page 12)FTER EXPERIENCING SEVERE
turmoil for several months, the
foreign exchange market in
South Korea seems to be stabi-
lizing (Chart 1). Recently we
have seen some implementa-
tion of reform plans supported by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), ex-
tension of $24 billion in short-term
loans to Korean commercial banks
(with government guarantees), and four
consecutive months of trade surplus
($11 billion in first quarter 1998). Are
these signs of the end of Korea’s finan-
cial crisis? Assessing the future of the
Korean economy requires a review of
the processes by which the structural
reform plans are implemented.
The underlying conditions for the 
financial crisis in Korea have been
nourished by the government’s long-
time control of and intervention in the
economy. With the hope of expanding
the economy, the Korean government
deliberately managed the distribution of
resources so that conglomerates, called
chaebols, could grow without con-
straints. Consequently, the nation’s pri-
vate financial sector never seriously
took off. The chaebols’ inefficiencies 
increased as they became larger. The 
crisis broke when foreign investors 
realized that the chaebols’ investments
were not efficient and the government
might no longer be able to feed all the
ailing chaebols.
The structural reform plans in the
IMF-supported program were designed
to restructure the economy to function
more efficiently in the long run as well
as stabilize the foreign exchange market
in the short run. Many of the reform
measures represent a departure from
the traditional Korean styles of eco-
nomic and corporate management. So
the question is whether the measures
can be implemented effectively, thereby
changing the traditional styles.
Although the Korean government
promised to observe the structural re-
form plans, implementation has been
slow. The only exception has been lib-
eralization of capital inflows, which the
government believes is urgently needed
to stabilize the foreign exchange market.
In February the government ordered
banks to grant loan extensions of $24
billion to small and mid-size companies
for an additional six months (an ex-
change rate of 1,000 Korean won for one
U.S. dollar is used throughout this arti-
cle). It also declared that it would not
allow further bankruptcy of big compa-
nies until the end of this year. However,
this bankruptcy delay does not seem to
accompany any concrete plan for re-
capitalizing the financial sector, which
will cost an estimated $100 billion.
Since the crisis broke, the financial
status of the chaebols has not im-
proved. The debt–capital ratio of major
chaebols has increased, and the practice
of self-lending within the chaebols has
continued. As of yet there are no sig-
nificant signs that the chaebols are 
becoming more market driven. For ex-
ample, Hyundai and Samsung are com-
peting to take over defunct Kia Motors
to increase size, not profits.
The labor laws have been amended
to allow for a more flexible labor market
and to make foreign investment in the
highly unionized banking sector more
attractive. But in a society with a poor
safety net for the unemployed, social re-
sistance against massive layoffs is strong.
So far the Korean government has
been more concerned about dealing
with the immediate foreign exchange
problem than solving the long-term
problem of a weak banking sector. The
reform effort has been unfocused as
there has been no single authority im-
plementing the various government
ministries’ reforms. Furthermore, the
structure of this hierarchical Confucian
society is still rigid, with the feudal
chaebols trying to keep their traditional
privileges.
Unless the Korean government sets up
a system to implement the reforms effec-
tively and individuals view the changes
as positive for the long-run health of the
economy, Korea will continue to be
vulnerable to relatively small shocks in-
side and outside the country.
—Jahyeong Koo
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SOURCE: Dow Jones.N VIEW OF the recent fluctuations
in the value of the Texas Leading
Index, it is important to understand
the source of this volatility.
1 These
movements can be attributed to
the Real Texas Value of the Dollar
(TXVD). The TXVD is one of the eight
components of the Texas Leading Index
and has lately become one of its most
important contributors. From September
1997 through January 1998, the TXVD
was the largest overall contributor to
the Leading Index.
The TXVD, the Texas equivalent of
the Trade Weighted Value of the Dollar
(TWVD), is an index of the weighted
value of the inflation-adjusted dollar 
relative to the inflation-adjusted curren-
cies of other countries. Each country is
assigned a weight based on the size of
exports it receives from Texas relative
to total exports. There are 48 countries
in the TXVD, accounting for 94.7 per-
cent of the Texas exports. Mexico is the
largest country in this index, with 35.9
percent of the weight, followed by
Canada (9.8 percent) and Japan (4.06
percent). Therefore, movements in the
value of the Mexican peso will affect
the TXVD more than movements in any
of the other currencies.
The TXVD is inversely related to the
Texas Leading Index (Chart 1). In other
words, an increase in the TXVD affects
the Texas Leading Index negatively,
while a decrease in the TXVD gives it a
positive boost. The TXVD is included in
the Leading Index because it serves as
an indicator for the price of Texas ex-
ports. When the value of the TXVD in-
creases, these exports become more
expensive for Texas’ trading partners.
This could result in a reduction in the
volume of Texas exports.
From September 1997 through Janu-
ary 1998, the TXVD saw rapid growth
of 5.4 percent. The bulk of this growth
can be attributed to the Asian crisis,
during which most of the East Asian
countries suffered strong devaluations
of their currencies. Indonesia, Thailand,
Philippines, South Korea and Malaysia
were affected the most by the crisis. 
Indonesia saw its currency depreciate
by as much as 140 percent against the
dollar in real terms. As Chart 2 shows,
growth in the TXVD would have been
insignificant if the Asian countries had
been excluded from this index. The
combined weight of all the Asian coun-
tries included in the TXVD is 20 percent
of the total. This weight is significant
enough to cause important changes in
the TXVD.
During the September 1997–January
1998 period, the Texas Leading Index
fell each month except January. The 
cumulative decline was 0.5 percent. If
the TXVD had remained unchanged,
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NOTE: Asia includes Japan, South Korea, Malaysia,
China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia,
Thailand, Taiwan and Philippines.the Leading Index would not have
fallen.
The effects of the Asian crisis are
similar to those observed during the
peso crisis at the end of 1994. From De-
cember 1994 to March 1995, the Mexi-
can peso lost as much as 50 percent of
its value against the dollar in real terms.
This dramatic devaluation of the peso
caused the TXVD to rise sharply—by
20.1 percent—during the November
1994–March 1995 period. At the same
time, the Texas Leading Index declined
by 1.6 percent. It is important to note
that even though the peso devaluation
was not as large as some of the devalu-
ations that took place during the Asian
crisis, it had a bigger effect on the
TXVD—a consequence of Mexico’s
greater weight in this index. During
both of these crises, the TXVD was the
largest contributor to the changes in the
Texas Leading Index and, hence, was
the driving force in its decline.
Currently, the TXVD has edged
down, driven by a decline in the value
of the dollar against the Asian curren-
cies as these currencies strengthened.
This decline in the TXVD contributed,
along with other positive components,
to a 0.6 percent increase in the Leading




1 The Texas Leading Index is a measure of the current conditions in 
the Texas economy; the higher its value, the better are economic 




For more information on employment
data, see “Reassessing Texas Employment
Growth” (Southwest Economy, July/August
1993). For TIPI, see “The Texas Industrial 
Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic 
Review, November 1989). For the Texas
Leading Index and its components, see 
“The Texas Index of Leading Indicators: 
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas
Fed  Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are
available on the Dallas Fed’s Internet Web
site, www.dallasfed.org.
Thousands of persons Index, 1987 = 100 January–March 1998
Total Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1995 = 100
Texas Leading Index and Nonfarm Employment Net Contributions of Components to Change in Leading Index
Texas Industrial Production Index (TIPI)













1995 1996 1997 1998
Percent
1.80 –.80 –.60 –.40 –.20 0 .20 .40 .60 .80 1.00 1.20 1.40 1.60
Average weekly hours –.16
Help-wanted index
Texas Stock Index















































Texas employment* Total nonfarm employment*
Texas Private
Leading TIPI Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
3/98 124.6 128.5 167.9 476.7 1,094.7 1,498.1 5,586.8 8,824.2 1,867.2 714.3
2/98 125.1 128.9 169.2 474.4 1,092.2 1,494.5 5,566.5 8,796.8 1,862.8 714.0
1/98 123.9 128.8 168.4 470.7 1,090.1 1,494.3 5,548.1 8,771.6 1,857.2 714.6
12/97 123.6 128.8 166.8 464.5 1,091.5 1,492.0 5,519.1 8,733.9 1,854.9 712.7
11/97 123.9 128.4 166.7 462.1 1,089.2 1,490.0 5,502.4 8,710.4 1,852.0 711.9
10/97 124.5 128.8 166.8 458.6 1,086.1 1,487.0 5,481.6 8,680.1 1,849.4 711.1
9/97 124.6 127.9 166.6 460.1 1,085.6 1,486.5 5,462.2 8,661.0 1,845.4 708.8
8/97 122.8 127.2 166.4 459.4 1,084.5 1,481.3 5,442.7 8,634.3 1,839.4 710.0
7/97 123.0 127.6 166.5 456.7 1,082.3 1,474.2 5,430.7 8,610.4 1,841.3 709.4
6/97 121.3 127.0 165.4 457.2 1,081.8 1,471.3 5,417.3 8,593.0 1,839.5 708.9
5/97 121.4 125.5 164.6 456.2 1,078.6 1,477.3 5,389.7 8,566.4 1,838.2 707.5
4/97 120.2 124.7 163.6 452.9 1,075.4 1,475.7 5,363.6 8,531.2 1,838.2 704.4
* in thousands
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ironically, when fixed exchange
rate arrangements are failing or are
under pressure around the world.
11
On a brighter note, other nations
such as Great Britain and Canada
have taken strides toward deregu-
lating their economies. Still others,
like South Korea and perhaps
Japan, have only just begun.
—John V. Duca 
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1 This is true even if the volatile food and energy components
are excluded from the consumer price index (CPI) and if the
CPI is adjusted for recent technical changes.
2 This is not to say that the so-called new paradigm lasts 
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3 Data are from John V. Duca and David D. VanHoose, “The
Rise of Goods Market Competition and the Fall of Nominal
Wage Contracting,” manuscript, 1998. Duca and VanHoose
splice estimates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and
from Leo Troy and Neil Sheflin, Union Sourcebook, 1985,
(West Orange, NJ: Industrial Relations Data and Information
Services).
4 Bureau of Labor Statistics.
5 See Linda Bell and Douglas Kruse, “Evaluating ESOPs,
Profit Sharing, and Gain Sharing Plans in U.S. Industries:
Effects on Worker and Company Performance,” U.S. De-
partment of Labor, manuscript, March 1995.
6 For data and discussion, see John V. Duca and David D.
VanHoose, “Goods Market Competition and Profit-Sharing:
A Multisector Macro Approach,” Journal of Economics and
Business, forthcoming.
7 See John V. Duca and David D. VanHoose, “The Rise of
Goods Market Competition and the Decline in Wage Index-
ation,” Journal of Macroeconomics, forthcoming.
8 Data are from John V. Duca and David D. VanHoose, “The
Rise of Goods Market Competition and the Fall of Nominal
Wage Contracting,” 1998, manuscript.
9 See John V. Duca and David D. VanHoose, “Goods Market
Competition and Profit Sharing: A Multisector Macro 
Approach,” Journal of Economics and Business, forthcom-
ing. In addition to making it more desirable to make pay
more market sensitive via profit sharing, increased compe-
tition may have induced more profit sharing through a re-
structuring channel. In deregulated industries, some firms
have gained wage and layoff concessions by agreeing to
share future profits. For example, workers at United Airlines
agreed to wage concessions in early 1994 in exchange for
eventually owning a majority stake in that airline.
10 For evidence and discussion, see John V. Duca and David
D. VanHoose, “Has Greater Competition Restrained United
States Inflation?” 1998, manuscript.
11 For further discussion, see W. Michael Cox, “The Churn:
The Paradox of Progress,” 1992 Annual Report, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas, 1992, 5–18.
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